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I. Introduction
The most ambitious attempt to date to create an
institutional mechanism for the resolution of inter-
national investment disputes--conflicts between foreign
private investors and host state governments--is the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States.1 The
Convention provides for arbitration or conciliation
under the auspices of the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a body
attached to the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank). But in spite of the
clear necessity for a widely-accepted means of resolv-
ing such conflicts, 2 the success of ICSID arbitration
*Member, New York Bar; J.D. 1977 (Yale); Ph.D. 1971 (Kansas);
attorney with Coudert Brothers, New York,
1. [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1270; T.I.A.S. No. 6090; 575 U.N.T.S.
159 (done Aug. 25, 1965, entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [here-
inafter: Convention, cited by article only]. Text and accompanying
Executive Directors' Report also in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 892 (1966);
4 INT'L LEGAL NATERIALS 524 (1965). In the U.S. the agreement was
partially implemented by the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 344 (1966), 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650,
1650a (1970).
2. It has been termed the major purpose of the Convention
that the availability of such a mechanism will promote private in-
vestment and economic development in third-world countries by improv
ing the investment climate for investors and host states alike. See
Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS
331 (Hague Academy of Int'l Law 1972).
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remains, at best, qualified.
In the twelve years since the Convention entered
into force, about half the world's states have become
signatories. 3  But in that same period only six dis-
putes have been submitted to the Centre for arbitration;
and none of these has yet been decided on the merits by
an arbitral tribunal.4 Whether investors and host state
politicians will perceive ICSID arbitration as a useful
3. As of June 30, 1977, 73 states had signed the Convention,
of which 67 had deposited their instruments of ratification; ICSID,
11TH ANNUAL REPORT 1976-77, at 6 (1977). Other indicators of
success are the facts that numerous bilateral treaties contain
provisions relating to ICSID, id. at 20-28, that several states
have promulgated implementing legislation, id. at 29-30, and that
there is a growing practice of inserting submission clauses into
international investment agreements, id. at 4. Furthermore, it may
well be that the mere availability of compulsory international
arbitration has contributed to fair dealing in the conclusion,
performance, and renegotiation of investment agreements. See Smith
& Wells, Conflict Avoidance in Concession Agreements, 17 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 51 (1976); Szasz, A Practical Guide to the Convention on
Settlement of Investment Disputes, I CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1 (1968).
There are, however, significant lacunae in state acceptance
of ICSID, notably among Latin American countries, This is attributable
to the region's historical insistence upon exclusive national juris-
diction over aliens, reflected in the Calvo doctrine. It was apparentl
not appreciated that the Convention would accomplish what the Latin
American countries desired -most: the preclusion of intervention by
an alien's government on his behalf. See Rogers, Of Missionaries,
Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the
Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1978); Szasz, The Investment Disputes
Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 256 (1971).
4. Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. Morocco (submitted
Jan. 13, 1972); Adriano Gardella SpA v. Ivory Coast (submitted Mar. 6,
1974); Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Jamaica, Kaiser Bauxite Co.
v. Jamaica, and Reynolds Jamaica Mines, Ltd. and Reynolds Metals Co.
v. Jamaica (all submitted June 21, 1974); Gabon v. Societe SERETE S.A.
(submitted Oct. 5, 1976). See ICSID, 11TH ANNUAL REPORT 1976-77,
32-40 (1977). The Kaiser Bauxite and Alcoa Minerals arbitrations
have been discontinued by joint request of the parties. Id. at 36-37.
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institution or not, 5 and whether ICSID will acquire any
authority, the sine qua non for an institution lacking
an effective power base, depends only in part upon legal
elements. 6 But to the extent that the latter play an
independent role in these processes, the question of
the applicable law may well be the most important one.
Indeed, the Convention's choice-of-law provision,
Article 42, has been termed its weakest link.7
5. See Ryans & Baker, The International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 10 J. WORLD TRADE L.
65 (1976) (survey of perceptions of executives of major US. firms
shows skeptical attitude towards ICSID arbitration); Art. 2(21(c),
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281
(XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631;
(proclaiming exclusive national jurisdiction in host state for
disputes over compensation for expropriation unless other procedures
agreed to by state concerned). But see Tsegah & Tiewal, Arbitration
and the Settlement of Commercial Disputes: A Selective Survey of
African Practice, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 378, 386-87 (1975) (repudiation
in 1972 by Ghana of contracts entered into with foreigners was
accompanied by announcement of willingness to go to ICSID arbitration).
6. Temptations to rely upon naked power are likely to
remain high. In the proceedings brought against Jamaica, supra
note 4, Jamaica consistently failed to participate or to appoint its
arbitrator. ICSID, 11TH ANNUAL REPORT 976-77, 36-40 (1977). Host
governments may also rely on overt force. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1975, at 1, col. 6 (detention of investor's employees as hostages
by Libyan government in course of dispute over oil concessions).
On the other hand, perceptions of coercion by foreign investors
still loom large in the minds of decision-makers in developing
countries. See, e.g., 2 ICSID, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES
803 (1970) (history of Convention) (fears expressed during drafting
of Convention) Thereinafter cited as HISTORY].
7. Schwarzenberger, The Arbitration Pattern and the
Protection of Property Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN DOMKE 313, 319 (P. Sanders ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION].
92 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
This article proposes that the future success
of ICSID arbitration depends largely upon the
tribunal's determination of what substantive law is
to govern the proceedings. Scholarly attention to
the choice-of-law problem is therefore imperative.8
It is particularly necessary in light of the fact
that Art. 42 lends itself to an interpretation which
might unduly restrict a tribunal's choice of applicable
prescriptions, with the possible result that ICSID
arbitration may appear unacceptable to the relevant
decision-makers. This article explores the Convention's
procedural solution to the problem of determining the
applicable law and argues that that solution must be
supplemented by considerations of the substantive goals
8. Even if, as is to be hoped, the litigants forgo their
right to let the awards be unpublished, Art. 48(5), the small
number of cases and the specific facts and precise questions
submitted to arbitration are likely to limit the development of a
coherent theory on the subject by the ICSID tribunals themselves.
The systematic exploration of the applicable law under Art. 42 is,
therefore, peculiarly the province of scholars. The Convention
generally has been discussed fairly extensively in the literature,
and a number of writers have addressed themselves specifically to
Art, 42. The extant commentary, however, remains less than fully
responsive to all the issues raised by Art. 42. Such commentary
includes: J. CHERIAN, INVESTMENT CONTRACTS AND ARBITRATION:
THE WORLD BANK CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES
75-92 (1975); 2 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS §§ 14.04-14.07
(1978); Amerasinghe, Dispute Settlement Machinery in Relations between
States and Multinational Enterprises, 11 INT'L LAW. 45 (1977);
Masood, Law Applicable in Arbitration of Investment Disputes under
the World Bank Convention, 15 J. INDIAN L. INST. 311 (1973); Broches,
supra note 2, at 348; Firth, The Law Governing Contracts in
Arbitration under the World Bank Convention, 1 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 253 (1968); Kahn & Fell, The Law Applicable to Foreign
Investments: The Contribution of the World Bank Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 44 INDIANA L. J. 1 (1968);
Lauterpacht, The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Inter-
national Investment Disputes, in FACULTE DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSITE
DE GENEVE, RECUEIL D'ETUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMMAGE A
PAUL GUGGENHEIM 652 (1968).
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which the Convention is intended to serve. These are
twofold: to foster international cooperation for
economic development, 9 and, implicitly, to strengthen
ICSID arbitration as an integrative international
institution. It is submitted that broad and complex goals
such as these can be achieved only if the range of the
normative prescriptions which may be brought to bear on
a dispute is as wide as possible, and if the arbitrators
have the authority to design solutions which are persuasive
to other decision-makers. The ICSID Convention's choice-
of-law clause, properly understood, can meet these
requirements.
II. The Establishment of ICSID
The necessity for an internationally constituted
forum for the settlement of disputes between private
persons and governments arising out of transnational
investments has long been recognized,10 Considering
9. The "broad aim" of the Convention "is to foster inter-
national cooperation for economic development." ICSID, 11TH
ANNUAL REPORT 1976-77, at 3 (1977). See also § 9, Executive
Directors' Report (accompanying the Convention), 2 HISTORY, supra
note 6, at 1073. See also Broches supra note 2, at 348 (terming it
a major purpose of the Convention that the availability of a
dispute-settling mechanism promote private investment in developing
countries by improving the investment climate for investors
and host state alike). This common purpose of the signatories
may be deemed a general principle recognized by them. Such
principles are considered to be applicable by the tribunal. See
remarks by Guarino (Italy) at Geneva Meeting, 2 HISTORY, supra note
6, at 419.
10. See, e.g., Fatouros, The Quest for Legal Security of
Foreign Investments, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 257, 293 (1963); Snyder,
Foreign Investment Protection: The Dispute Solving Aspect, 3 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 127 (1965); Sohn, Proposal for the Establishment
of a System of International Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 63, 65-73 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
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the matter for simplicity's sake solely from the
perspective of an investor in search of a remedy against
the host government, the latter's courts will appear at
best biased,1 1 and at worst as participants in the
very process of deprivation of which he complains.1 2
The same objection may be leveled against nationally
constituted arbitration bodies.1 3 The courts of the
investor's own state, assuming there are no obstacles
to their assuming jurisdiction, will frequently be
of no avail because of his adversary's sovereign
immunity. Diplomatic protection, even if it were
a matter of right, 1 is subject to considerations of
political expediency in its manner of exercise. The
pursuit of the investor's claim by his government
before the International Court of Justice is in many
instances likely to founder upon a denial of standing.1 5
11. E.g., the voiding of the Sapphire arbitration award
(infra note 20) by the Iranian courts when enforcement was
sought on the ground that Iranian law, determined to be
inapplicable by the arbitrator, had not been applied. See 9
INT'L LEGAL NATERIALS 1118 C1970),
12. E.g., the establishment of a special tribunal by
the government of Chile to determine the compensation owed to
investors after the nationalization of American copper interests
under conditions which negated the very possibility of compensa-
tion. See Vicuna, Some International Law Problems Posed by
the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by Chile, 67 AN.
J. INT'L L. 711, 716-17 (1973) (defending the procedure as law-
ful).
13. E.g., the Soviet-Israeli Oil Arbitration (Jordan
Investment Ltd. v. Soyuzneftexport (1958)), 53 AM. J. INT'L L.
800 (1959) (Soviet All-Union Foreign Trade Arbitration Board
affirmed as lawful the cancellation by a Soviet state trading
agency of a contract on the ground of force majeure (failure
of Soviet government to issue export licence), using the
fiction of separate identities of the Soviet government and
its state trading agencies).
14. West Germany seems to be the only country where it
is seriously contended that a citizen has the right to demand
that his government take up his claim against a foreign state.
See Berger, Die Internationale Zentrale fuer Beilegung Von
Investitionsstreitigkeiten, 11 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES
BETRIEBSBERATERS 434 (1965).
15. See the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company
Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3 (denying standing to government pressing
a claim on behalf of its nationals who were investors in a
company chartered in a third country).
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Informal third party settlements are likely to be
available only in rare instances.1 6
Not surprisingly arbitration has long appeared
as an appropriate mechanism to fill this need. It
can take place under the auspices of the Permanent
Court of International Arbitration1 7 or of private
organizations such as the International Chamber of
CommercelB and similar institutions,1 9 or it can be
established ad hoc. 2 0 But none of these solutions
16. On a few occasions the World Bank has facilitated
the settlement of investment disputes, see Snyder, Foreign
Investment Protection: Is Institutional Arbitration an Answer?,
40 N.C.L. REV. 665, 676 n. 39 (1962).
17. The Permanent Court of Arbitration made provisions
for the settlement of disputes between parties of whom only
one is a state in 1962; see 12 M, WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1042-43 (1971).
18. See Bockstiegel, Arbitration of Disputes between
States and Private Enterprises in the International Chamber of
Commerce, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 579 (1965).
19. On arbitration under the auspices of the London
Court of Arbitration and the American Arbitration Association,
see Snyder, supra note 10 at 140-142.
20. The best-known cases of arbitrations between a
state and a foreign investor are the oil arbitrations of the
1950's: the AbuDhabi Case (Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast)
Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951), 1 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 247 (1952));
the Qatar Cases (Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd. V, Ruler
of Qatar (1950), 18 INTIL L. REP. 161 (1951) (award given without
reasons); Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co,, Ltd. (1953),
20 INT'L L. REP. 534 (1953)); the Aramco award Case (Saudi Arabia
v. Arabian American Oil Co. (1958), 27 INT'L L. REP. 117 (1963));
and the Sapphire Case (Sapphire International Petroleumls Ltd. v.
National Iranian Oil Co. (1963), 35 INT'L L. REP. 136 (1967)
13 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. l011 (1964)). A number of cases
predate World War II; the earliest, an arbitration between
Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, dates from 1864. See A. STUYT,
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794-1970 459-490 (1972).
Arbitration provisions are not infrequently included in investment
treaties. See Berger, Vermoegensschutz im Ausland durch Investitions-
foerderungsvertraege, 11 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFTSDIENST DES BETRIEBSBERATERS
1, 7-8 (1965).
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has proved itself wholly satisfactory in practice,
whether for reasons of limited standing, access, fears
of bias, political considerations, problems of
enforcement, or for other reasons. ICSID arbitration,
by contrast, redresses many of these perceived
deficiencies of other models of dispute resolution.
2 1
The Convention was sponsored by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which began
its preparatory work in 1961. After successive drafts
and amendment by the interested participants a final
text of the Convention was adopted in 1965.22
21. See Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
17 HARV. INT'L L. REV. 90, 103-108 (1976).
22. The travaux preparatoires of the Convention were
published in 1970. See HISTORY, supra note 6 (vol. I: ANALYSIS
OF DOCUMENTS; vol. II: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION; vol. III: DOCUMENTS RELATIFS A
L'ORIGINE ET A L'ELABORATION DE LA CONVENTION; vol. IV:
DOCUMENTOS RELATIVOS AL ORIGEN Y A LA FORMULACION DEL CONVENIO).
The drafting history of the Convention was as follows: A Working
Paper (draft convention) dated June 5, 1962, was prepared by the
General Counsel of the World Bank and transmitted to the Bank's
Executive Directors (Document 6, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 19).
Meeting as a Committee of the Whole, the Executive Directors
redrafted the Working Paper (Document 21, id. at 133) and subse-
quently produced the Preliminary Draft of October 15, 1963
(Document 24, id. at 184). The Preliminary Draft was debated at
regional consultative meetings of legal experts in Addis Ababa
(Dec. 16-20, 1963), Santiago, Chile (Feb. 3-7, 1964), Geneva
(Feb. 17-22, 1964), and Bangkok (April 27-May 1, 1964), hereinafter
referred to as Addis Ababa (etc.) Meeting (Documents 25, 27, 29,
31; id. at 236, 298, 367, 458, respectively). Taking account of
these regional meetings, the Bank's staff prepared the First Draft
of September 11, 1964 (Document 43, id, at 610). This draft was
considered by a Legal Committee consisting of representatives
of the Bank's member states and then replaced by the Revised
Draft of December 11, 1964 (Document 123, id. at 911). After final
consideration by the Executive Directors, the present text of the
Convention was adopted (Document 145, id. at 1041). See 1 id. at
,2-10 (synopsis of drafting history).
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Under the final version of the Convention, signa-
tories and nationals of other signatories may agree
to submit legal disputes arising out of investment
contracts to compulsory conciliation or arbitration.
Once agreed upon, the right to arbitration cannot
be unilaterally defeated. The distinguishing
features of the Convention are the creation of a
procedurally self-contained mechanism, the possi-
bility for an individual to proceed directly
against a state in an international forum, the
individual's government's renunciation of its
right to extend diplomatic protection to its
national, and the host government's obligation to
respect an arbitral award as it would a judgment
of a domestic court. The Convention established
the International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes, attached to the World Bank. ICSID
consists of a Secretariat and a governing body,
the Administrative Council, composed of one repre-
sentative of each signatory and chaired by the
president of the-Bank. The Secretariat maintains
panels of conciliators and arbitrators. Arbitration
proceedings are instituted, and arbitration panels
constituted, upon the submission of a dispute by
either party to an investment agreement. When such
a dispute arises each party chooses one arbitrator,
and the two persons so selected in turn decide upon
a third member of the tribunal. All decisions of
the arbitrators are by majority rule.
Despite extensive debate and amendment, several
matters of significance are not resolved in the
Convention. 23 For example, it has only recently
been established that refusal of one party to attend
or participate in arbitral proceedings does not
defeat the jurisdiction of the tribunal.2 Other
23. See generally Amerasinghe, Submissions to the
Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 5 J. MARITIME L. & COMM. 211 (1974);
Broches, supra note 2.
24. See Schmidt, supra note 21.
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areas-of tncertaint include questions of personal2 5
and subject matter2 jurisdiction, modes of sub-
mission of disputes ,27 the relation between IOSID
arbitration and other remedial measures,28 and the
possibility and effect of subrogation by an inves-
tor's state. 2 9 Perhaps the most important of these
unsettled areas is the question of the applicable law.
25. There is room for uncertainty as to the conditions
under which a corporation would no longer qualify as a
national of another state and hence not be entitled to resort
to ICSID arbitration. See Art. 25(2) (defining "national");
Broches, supra note 2, at 356.
26. ICSID tribunals have jurisdiction over "legal"
disputes arising out of "investment" relationships under Art.
25, but both of these terms are left undefined. See
Executive Directors' Report, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at
1078.
27. It is unclear whether investment legislation accept-
ing ICSID arbitration amounts to a submission of all future
disputes arising between the host state and an investor availing
himself of such legislation. Compare Executive Directors'
Report, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 1077 (considering legislative
declaration of submission effective) with Rodley, Some Aspects
of the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 43, 49-50 (1966).
28. E.g., arbitration, either between investor and host
state or between states, required under bilateral investment
treaties. See Berger; supra note 14, at 443-44.
29. Subrogation by a state reimbursing its national
under a foreign investment insurance program was included in
the original draft of the Convention but was ultimately
deleted. See 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 1017-18. Hence
it has been said that ICSID arbitration is not available to
an investor's state which has reimbursed the investor under
an insurance program and has become subrogated to the
investor. Broches, La Convention et Z'assurance-investissement:
Le probleme dit de la subrogation, INVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS
ET ARBITRAGE ENTRE ETATS ET PERSONNES PRIVEES, LA CONVENTION
B.I.R.D. DU 18 MARS 1965, at 161 (1969). But this may not
dispose of the problem. See Rodley, supra note 27, at 53;
Berger, supra note 14, at 443-44.
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III. Choice of Law Under the Convention:
History and Construction of
Article 42
The law applicable to international investments
can either be defined substantively (in terms of a
preferred public order) or procedurally (in terms
of binding constitutive processes). Substantive
solutions have been proposed3 0 and continue to be
advocated,31 but the drafters of the Convention did
not attempt to address the controversial subject
of the substantive law of international investment.
Determined to assure the widest possible acceptability
for their proposal,they opted'for a procedural solu-
tion: Article 42 determines who shall be competent
to decide what prescriptions shall be applicable.
It provides:
(1) The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in
accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed by the parties. In the absence of
such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the
law of the Contracting State party to the
dispute (including its rules on the conflict
of laws) and such rules of international law
as may be applicable.
(2) The Tribunal may not bring in a finding
of non liquet on the ground of silence or
obscurity of the law.
(3) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2)
shall not prejudice the power of the Tribunal
to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the
parties so agree.
The heart of the provision is paragraph (1). Para-,
graph (2), which prohibits a finding of non liquet,
adds little that would not be understood in any
30. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 7, at 313.
31. See Ryans & Baker, supra note 5 (finding support
for substantive law of international investment among business-
men surveyed).
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event.3 2  Paragraph (3), which authorizes a decision
ex aequo et bono at the parties' option, is a common
provision in conventions of this kind33 and raises
few problems.34 It is, in any event, unlikely to
be used very often. 35 Its major significance lies
in the fact that it removes any doubts that ICSID
arbitrators are bound to apply law and not to
exercise arbitral equity unless specifically authorized
to do so.
32. See Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition
of Non Liquet and the Completeness of the Legal Order, in
SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 196, 200 (1958)(prohibition of non liquet is
one of the most undisputable rules of international law). The
non liquet prohibition was included in the first Working Paper,
2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 41. It elicited no comments beyond
the remark by Broches (Chairman) that such provisions are
commonly included in conventions of this kind, Santiago Meeting,
id. at 330.
33. See, e.g._ Art. 38(2), Statute of the International
Court of Justice; Art. 28, Geneva General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, 93 L,N.T.S. 343, 355 (1929),
71 U.N.T.S. 101, 116 (1950); Art. 2(1), International Law
Commission, Draft on Arbitral Procedure, 11958] 2 Y.B. INTIL L.
COMM'N 1, 4; Art. 26, European Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, 320 1J.N.TS. 243, 254
(1959); Art. 30, Organization for African Unity, Protocol of
the Council of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration,
3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1116, 1123 (1964).
34. The authorization to decide ex aequo et bono was
already included, in only editorially different form, in the
first Working Paper, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 41. Ex aequo
et bono was defined as a decision in accordance with what is
just and equitable in the circumstances, rather than by
application of rules of law. Comment, Preliminary Draft, id.
at 215. The drafters of the Convention rejected proposals
to empower the tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono on its
own motion. Chairman's Report, id, at 570. It remained
unsettled whether, in deciding ex aequo et bono, reasons had
to be stated (contra, remarks by Lowenfeld (U.S.), Santiago
Meetings, id. at 330) and whether a decision ex aequo would
necessarily prevent the forum from applying law (compare
remarks by Allott (U.K.), Geneva Meeting, id. at 420, with
those by Melchor (Spain), id. at 419).
35. The competence of international tribunals to decide
ex aequo et bono has hardly ever been invoked, See Scheuner,
Decisions ex aequo et bono by International Courts and Arbitral
Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 275-76.
See also Sohn, Arbitration of International Disputes Ex aequo
et bono, id, at 330. But see the Societe Europeenne Case (Societe
Europeenne d'Etudes et d'Enterprises v. Yugoslavia (1956), 86
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1075 (1959) (arbitrators empowered
to act as amiables corpositeurs)).
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A. The Range of Relevant Prescriptions
The prescriptions potentially applicable to an
investment relationship include national and inter-
national rules as well as custom, whether evidenced
by the practice of states or of business firms.
During the drafting of Art. 42, repeated efforts
were made to restrict the range of the prescriptions
applicable to investment disputes. Significantly,
these efforts remained unsuccessful. They took
two basic forms: (1) demands to exclude the applica-
bility of international law,36 or, failing that, to
define it restrictively,37 and (2) demands to make the
host state's law exclusively applicable unless other-
wise stipulated by the parties,3 8 or even notwith-
standing their stipulation.3 9
The last mentioned proposal fai ed to elicit
support and was summarily rejected.,v In opposition
to the demand for exclusive applicability of the host
state's law, it was pointed out that, as far as
different municipal legal systems might be pertinent
to a dispute, ordinary conflict principles should not
36. See remarks by Serb (Yugoslavia), Legal Committee,
2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 801. Although similar in effect
to demands to make the host state's law exclusively applicable,
the denial of the applicability of international law to
transnational investments must be distinguished from denials
of the applicability of particular national rules. See remarks
by Broches, Committee of the Whole, id. at 985 (explaining
objections to application of national law other than the host
state's law as relics of the regime of capitulations, and thus
as distinct from objections to international law).
37. See statements by Brinas (Philippines), Legal
Committee, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 800 (international law
applicable only where discrimination is alleged); Guarino (Italy),
Geneva Meeting, id. at 419 (international law means prohibition
of discrimination and obligation to act in good faith); Broches,
Chairman's Report on Regional Meetings, id. at 571 (interna-
tional law applicable only where violated by national law).
38. See formal proposals by China (Taiwan), Thailand,
and Turkey, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 652-53, 660, 663,
respectively. See also remarks by Cunha (Brazil) in the Legal
Committee, id. at 801; by Adarkar (India), Bangkok Meeting, id.
at 505; proposed amendment by Tsai (China), id, at 513; remarks
by Askari (Iran), id. at 516.
39. See statement by Lopez (Panama), Legal Committee,
2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 803.
40. See statement by Broches (Chairman), id.
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be precluded. 41 The opponents thus forwarded the
claim that states other than the host state expected
to see their own prescriptive competence recognized.
The express invocation of the host state's conflict
rules in the language which was eventually adopted
establishes that other states are indeed competent
to issue prescriptions.42 The fact that Art. 42
refers to the law of states other than the host state
only indirectly through the medium of the latter's
conflict rules may indicate a restriction upon the
invocability of the law of other states, but such
a restriction, should it indeed exist, would not
detract from the recognition of other states as
competent to prescribe, at least in principle.
The demand to deny the applicability of inter-
national law was resisted with the argument that
since the investor's state was waiving its right to
protect its nationals abroad,43 the investor should
be given the protection of international law.44
Such protection was indeed qualified in that the
tribunal was empowered to invoke only such inter-
national law "as may be applicable," given that no
similar constraints were attached to the putative
relevance of the host state's law. But mere limita-
tions upon the circumstances under which international
rules may be invoked do not amount to a denial of
41. See remarks by Broches (Chairman), Legal Committee,
id. at 800.
42. See aZso statement by Broches (Chairman), Legal
Committee, id. at 985 (host state law would apply in the
normal case--implying affirmation of prescriptive competence of
other states).
43. Art. 27 (1) provides:
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection,
or bring an international claim, in respect of a dis-
pute which one of its nationals and another Contracting
State shall have consented to submit or shall have sub-
mitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless
such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide
by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.
44. See remarks by Gourevitch (U.S.), Legal Committee,
2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 803; Bertram (Germany), Geneva
Meeting, id. at 421. See also remarks by Broches (Chairman)
and Brown (Tanganyika), Addis Ababa Meeting, id. at 259
(investor enabled by Convention to press his claim on same
basis as his state).
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prescriptive competences as such.
B. Party Choice and Preemption of the
Applicable Law
The first sentence of Art. 42(1) makes clear that the
parties themselves are primarily competent to determine
the law applicable to their relationship. It is equally
clear that the parties are not confined to selecting any
one legal system as a whole.45 Such a constraint might
have been implied had the drafters chosen to allow the
parties to determine "the law."t46 However, the language,
"rules" of law, indicates that they may select not merely
a national legal system, but also general principles,
international law, or specific rules of different systems,
as well as such rules of an international law merchant as
they may deem desirable.47 Such extensive party autonomy
corresponds to past practice as reflected in the provisions
actually included in investment agreements4 8 as well as in
the determinations of the applicable law by ad hoc
45. But see the language of model clauses suggesting the
practice of selecting a legal system in toto. ICSID, Model Clauses
Recording Consent to the Jurisdiction of the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (Document ICSID/5) 17-18
(mimeographed, undated). See also Amerasinghe, Model Clauses for
Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes, 28 ARB. J. (n.s.) 232 (1973).
46. See the original Working Paper, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at
41, and subsequent drafts, id. at 157, 214, 630.
47. See Kahn & Fell, supra note 8, at 18; Masood, supra note 8,
at 317. See also Kahn, The Standard Investment Agreement: Text and
Comment, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 39, 52 (1974) (noting importance
of trade practices as sources of law). Art. 6 of the Standard
Agreement provides: "Relations between the parties are governed by
this agreement, by the professional usages generally admitted in the
textile industry, by the law of the host country and by the principles
of international law applicable to investments."
48. References to good faith and to customary professional
or industry practices are customarily included in investment
agreements. See Delaume, Des stipulations de droit applicable
dans les accords de pret et de developpement economique et de
leur role, [1968] REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 336 (survey of 80
investment agreements). See also the standard agreement cited in
note 47 supra.
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arbitration tribunals, 49
While Art. 42(l) clarifies the wide scope
of the parties' autonomy, it remains silent on the
question of whether the tribunal could invoke
prescriptions other than those selected by the
parties. It is anticipated that in the "normal
situation" the parties will have made such a
selection, typically by agreeing on one of the
broad model choice of law clauses suggested by
ICSID. 5 1 But the Convention does not make clear
whether such a choice is to be considered pre-
emptive--i.e., exclusive--by the arbitral tribunal.
The preemption issue thus might arise in situations
where the parties have made a blanket invocation
of a particular legal system, but where other
international decision-makers assert strong claims
that in the instant controversy their own prescrip-
tions rather than those of the decision-maker
designated by the parties, should be controlling.
49.For example, in the Sapphire Case, supra
note 20, the tribunal relied upon the parties' invocation of
the principle of good faith in order to deny the exclusivity
of the stipulated host state law and to derive an applicable
prescription from the agreements between the Iranian govern-
ment and other oil companies. See Kahn & Fell, supra note 8,
at 9, 30; Lalive, Un recent arbitrage Suisse entre un
organisme d'etat et une societe privee etrangere 19 ANNUAIRE
SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 273 (1962).
50. Some of the draftsmen evidently considered the
parties' determination preemptive. See 2 HISTORY, supra note 6,
at 267 (parties entitled to agree on exclusion of international
law), and remarks by Broches in the Committee of the Whole, id.
at 985. See also Broches, Settlement of Investment Disputes, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 7, at 17,
51. See note 44 supra.
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The opening language of Art. 42, "Itjhe Tribunal
shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules
of law as may be agreed by the parties," leaves no
doubt that the parties themselves are primarily
competent to invoke the prescriptions which the
tribunal shall apply, a regulation which corresponds
to other arbitration rules.5 2 But this does not
necessarily imply exclusive competence. Although
some of the draftsmen evidently considered the parties'
determination preemptive, 5 3 this allocation of
competence does not preclude the invocation by the
tribunal of prescriptions in addition to those invoked
by the parties.
The tribunal's competence to invoke additional
prescriptions is expressly granted by the non liquet
prohibition for those circumstances where the law
designated by the parties is obscure or silent on
the point at issue. It is less clear whether the
tribunal is competent to invoke further prescriptions
where the parties' choice appears to be comprehensive.
Arguably, the absence of an explicit specifi-
cation as to how the parties shall designate the
applicable law might be construed to require an
express choice, absent which the tribunal would
remain competent to invoke whatever rules it might
deem applicable.54 Such a broad reading of Art. 42(1)
however, is hardly tenable. Not only is deference to
the parties' choice central to the scheme of Art. 42,55
but the drafters clearly indicated that a generally
52. See, e.g., Art. 10(1), Int'l L. Comm., Model Rules
on Arbitral Procedure, supra note 33.
53. See remarks by Broches (Chairman), Addis Ababa
Meeting, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 267 (stating that it
was for the parties in their agreement to exclude the
application of international law). See also remarks by
Broches, Committee of the Whole, id. at 985.
54. Such an argument finds support in the French text
of the Convention which speaks of the rules "adopted" Cadoptees)
by the parties, 3 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 837. But see
Broches, supra note 2, at 389 (French text implies no different
meaning than English phrase "agreed").
55. See, e.g., Broches, supra note 50, at 16.
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worded or even implicit agreement would suffice.5 6
Most commentators are of the same opinion, and
past practice is largely in accord.57 But to say
this much does not dispose of the question whether
on a particular issue before the tribunal the parties'
general invocation of law necessarily preempts
the tribunal's invocation of an alternative competing
prescription, whether one of international law,
domestic legislation, or law merchant, which is
addressed specifically to the issue in question.
The language of Art. 42(1) suggests that the
parties' choice is not automatically preemptive.
The provision's requirement that the "rules" of
law agreed by the parties shall apply, rather than
"the law" agreed upon, which language was found in
earlier drafts, suggests that only when the parties'
choice amounts to the invocation of a particular
prescription is the tribunal unalterably bound by
the command of Art. 42(1) that it "shall decidei
in accordance with the parties' determination.9
8
56. See remarks by Broches CChairman) at Addis Ababa
Meeting, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 267; Rodocanachi (France)
at Geneva Meeting, id, at 418; Chairman's report on Regional
Meetings, id. at 570.
57. See, e.g., Masood, supra note 8, at 318. But see
Broches, supra note 2, at 389.
58. The change in language was made in order to
convey the idea that the parties should be free to tell the
tribunal which issues required its solution and which had
already been solved by agreement between them. Remarks by
Broches (Chairman), Legal Committee, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6,
at 803 (proposing revised language). It thus seems to have
been the expectation of the draftsmen that the parties would
select particular rules of law tied to their submission of
distinct issues to the tribunal, See also Masood, supra
note 8, at 316-18 (the term "rules" of law obliges the
parties to specify their choice with clarity and specific
relevance to particular issues). But see the Model Clauses,
note 45 supra.In the light of past arbitration practice, it
must be assumed that the inclusion of such a clause would
leave the tribunal at liberty to invoke additional prescriptions,
See notes 47, 48 supra,
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Such interpretation corresponds to past practice.
Tribunals have frequently treated the parties'
general designation as not precluding the applica-
bility of other specific rules. They have generally
interpreted the parties' choice of law clauses
liberally so as to enable the tribunal to invoke
rules not expressly designated, such as international
law, general principles, or the law of third states,
even where the parties had made determinations
which seemed to be comprehensive. 5 9 If the drafters
of Art. 42 had intended a significant departure from
past expectations about the competence of inter-
national arbitration tribunals, such intent would
reasonably require an explicit designation of what
constitutes an agreement sufficiently specific
to preclude the tribunal's invocation of additional
rules.
Once it is accepted that the parties' choice
of law is not necessarily preemptive, more difficult
questions arise: Under what conditions should the
parties' designation be denied preemptive force, and
by what criteria should the tribunal make its own
substitute selection? In certain circumstances it
is clear that the tribunal should both reject an
apparent selection by the parties and apply an
alternative rule. The fundamental criterion for such
substitution is the legal competence of the parties
to make the particular choice of law. For example,
the parties may not by stipulation circumvent peremptory
norms of international law.6 0 In a conflict between a
59. See Kahn & Fell, supra note 8, at 8; FirtL, id, at
268-70, For example, in The Kronprins Gustaf Adolf (United States v. Sweden)
(1932), the compromis called for the determination whether the
conduct complained about conformed to certain treaties, but the
arbitrator nonetheless held general international law applicable.
6 ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 1931-1932,
372, 374 (1938).
60. "IA] peremptory norm of general international law is
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
... ' Art. 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Nay 22, 1969, 8. INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 698 (1969). See generally
Onuf & Birney, Peremptory Norms of International Law: Their
Source, Function and Future, 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 187
(1974).
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rule selected by the parties and international ius
cogens, the latter must prevail. Furthermore, in
cases where the parties have agreed that the law of
the investor's state (or for that matter of any
state other than the host state) shall apply, there
will nonetheless be aspects of their investment
relationship which would be subject to the host
state's law notwithstanding their agreement. Art.
42(1) resembles a conflict rule pertaining to
contracts, and the parties' competence to invoke
rules of law as they see fit can only extend to the
contractual part of their relationship. Given the
complexity of most investment enterprises, some
aspects of the relationship will be subject to the
host state's administrative, labor, monetary, regu-
latory or penal law. These areas of prescriptive
competence are conventionally viewed as inherently
reserved by the state, and therefore are not subject
to contractual waiver.61 In such circumstances,
even a specific agreement to the contrary by the
parties must be ignored.
There are further occasions where it is clear
that the parties' determination should not be con-
trolling, but where the host state's law is not
automatically applicable. The Convention leaves no
doubt that the parties' autonomy is confined to the
choice of rules which will not run counter to the
ordre public of the state where enforcement will
ultimately have to be sought. The signatories con-
sented to treat an arbitral award as binding and
enforceable as if it were a judgment of their
domestic courts. 6 2 Since -it was understood that a
state should not be entitled to geto enforcement
as contrary to its ordre public, 3 the tribunal is
61. See Goldman, Le droit applicable selon la Convention
de la B.I.R.D,, pour reglement des differends relattfs a=
investissements entre etats et ressortissants d'autres etats,
INVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS, supra note 29, at 154-55.
62. Art. 54M().
63. See statement by Lieftinck in the Committee of the
Whole, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 991. Nor may a state
unilaterally refuse to participate in arbitration by purporting
to withdraw certain matters from the jurisdiction of the
tribunal. See Schmidt, supra note 21.
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compelled to eny a choice of law which might produce such
a situation.6° Since the state where enforcement will
be sought will typically be the host state, this
limitation is most likely to become operative where
the parties have chosen the host state's law and agreed
to stabilize it in time, as they are entitled to do, 65
and where subsequent changes in the host state law
have rendered the chosen rules incompatible with its
current ordre public and hence unenforceable. The
tribunal would then find itself in a position analo-
gous to the situation envisioned in Art. 42(2) where
the chosen law has lacunae or is obscure, thus
empowering the tribunal to determine the applicable
law for itself despite the parties' ostensible choice.
The appropriate procedure for undertaking this
determination is implied by the non liquet prohibition
of Art. 42(2). The locus classicus prescribing the
procedure to be followed is Art. 1 of the Swiss Civil
Code, which provides that if neither statute nor
custom yields a prescription, the judge shall decide
according to the rule which he would adopt as a
legislator, taking into account accepted doctrine
and precedent. 6 6 The arbitral tribunal must therefore
64. Consider the refusal by the Iranian courts to
grant enforcement of the Sapphire arbitration award, supra note
20, on the ground that Iranian law, determined by the arbitrator
to be inapplicable, had not been applied, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1118 (1970). The tribunal had relied upon the parties' invocation
of the principle of good faith in order to deny exclusivity to
the stipulated host state (Iranian) law and to derive an applicable
prescription from the agreements in existence between Iran and
other oil companies. See Lalive, supra note 49.
65. See, e.g., Model Clauses, supra note 45 (providing
for agreement that applicable law should be that in force at a
specified time).
66. Art. 1, Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch (30th ed.
W. Schoenenberger 1971).
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determine which "legislature" would be competent to
prescribe in the instant case. In accordance with
the party autonomy principle of Art. 42(l), the
tribunal should adopt the parties' determination of
the competent prescribing authority, as implied by the
parties' choice of governing law. Thus the tribunal
would place itself in the role of the prescribing
authority which was competent to prescribe the rule
which the parties wished to invoke. It would then
determine which rule (given that the one actually
designated by the parties is denied applicability)
this authority would invoke.
Finally, the most important instances in which
the tribunal remains competent to invoke prescriptions
other than those agreed by the parties are certain
circumstances which call for the application of
international Jaw, but which do not rise to the level
of ius cogens.0 7 In such cases the tribunal may reject
an explicit choice by the parties of a particular
domestic legal system in order to give effect to norms
of international law. For example, an investor may
suffer injury at the hands of the host state which
does not breach the investment agreement but which
nonetheless is a violation of the duties under public
international law which every state owes to an alien
within its territory,6 8
67, But see Rodley, Some Aspects of the World Bank
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 4 CAN. Y.B,
INT'L L. 43, 50 (1966) (preemptive effect of parties' choice
unaffected by Convention's waiver of investors' states' right
to extend diplomatic protection).
68. See Garcia-Amador, Draft Articles on the ResponsibiZity
of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or
Property of Aliens, in F. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN, R. BAXTER, RECENT
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 1, 76 (1974) (explanatory comment). See also Art. 22(5),
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for
Injuries to Aliens, Final Draft with Explanatory Notes (L. Sohn and
R. Baxter, Reporters), id. at 135, and explanatory note, id. at
291-94.
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The signatories to the Convention cannot have
intended on the one hand to confer upon their
nationals investing abroad the cQmpetence to preclude
the applicability of international law to their
transactions with a foreign state, and on the other
hand, to waive their right to extend diplomatic
protection to such nationals,6 9 In past practice,
it had never been accepted that an investor who
consented to be treated as a national of the host
state and waived his right to invoke the diplomatic
protection of his own state 7 0 could thereby effectively
preclude the applicability of international
69, Art. 27(1), quoted in note 43 supra (waiver by investor's
state of right to extend diplomatic protection), This waiver was
agreed to in consideration of the fact that the Convention made a
forum available where individuals could press their claims
directly against the state. See, e.g., Report of the Executive
Director, § 33, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 1080; statement
by Broches, Committee of the Whole, id.at 59. In effect, this
waiver amounts to a recognition by the signatories of the inter-
national validity of a Calvo clause, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 202(1) (1965). It cannot
be assumed, however, that the signatories wished to extend the
reach of such a submission by an individual to the host state law
beyond those boundaries which had been claimed for it in the past.
These limits were drawn between obligations stipulated between the
parties and governed by their contract alone, and other injuries
beyond those arising out of violation of such stipulated obligations;
to the former, the Calvo clause applies, while to the latter, it
is inapplicable.
70. "If an alien, as a condition of engaging in economic
activity in the territory of a state, agrees with the state that he
is to be treated as if he were a national in respect to such
activity, and that his only remedy for injury in this respect is that
available under the law of the state, such agreement [is] commonly
called a 'Calvo Clause."' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), § 202(1). Such clauses may preclude
access to any forum other than those which may be provided by the
host state, with or without a simultaneous waiver of substantive
rights which the individual may have under international law.
See, e.g., Art, 18 of the contract in the North American Dredging
Company Case, 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 917 (1967).
But even where such a clause is phrased exclusively in procedural
terms, an agreement to avail oneself only of domestic fora may
make substantive international law unavailable,
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law.7 1 Since the Convention intends not to deviate
from this tradition, but rather to place the inves-
tor in as good a position as his own state in
pressing claims based upon public international
law,7 2 the tribunal is competent and indeed obliged
to invoke such rules as may be applicable to redress
such injuries. 73
It is only with respect to the investment agree-
ment itself that the investor is competent to bargain.
And the host state may not repudiate its duties under
international law by means of such a bargain. There-
fore, in determining whether international law is
applicable despite the parties' failure to invoke it,
the tribunal would initially inquire whether the
investment agreement was intended to cover the injury
in question. If not, the arbitrators would determine
whether an international law violation had taken place.
If the tribunal found that the parties' agreement
purported to exclude the application of
71. "While an individual alien may agree not to seek
international remedies with respect to certain economic rights,
it would be productive of grave injustice if an alien were
allowed to sign away completely his rights under international
law. It would appear to be a general principle of law recog-
nized by the principal legal systems of the world that a citizen
cannot by agreement waive the protection of the constitution
or basic law of the country of which he is a national. No
more should an individual have the capacity to give up entirely
the protection of that body of law which is superior to the laws
and constitutions of municipal legal systems." Explanatory
Note to Art. 22 (5), Convention on the International Responsibility
of States for Injuries to Aliens, in F. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN &
R. BAXTER, supra note 68, at 292.
72. See remarks by Gourevitch (U.S.) in the Legal
Committee, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 803; Gould (S. Africa)
and Bertram (Germany) at Geneva Meeting, id. at 420-21;
Broches (Chairman) and Brown (Tanganyika) at Addis Ababa
Meeting, id. at 259.
73. See remarks by Herndl (Austria) at Geneva Meeting,
id. at 421 (describing the question of the extent to which
parties should have the right to determine whether national or
international law should be applicable as a delicate one, and
suggesting that international law might in any event be applicable
to the international aspect of the dispute).
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international law to the claimed injury, it would
then ask whether the parties were competent to
bargain in this respect. If not, international law
would be deemed applicable and the inquiry would
proceed to a determination whether such law had been
violated.
C. Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice
by the Parties
In the absence of an invocation of applicable
rules by the parties, the Convention itself through
Art. 42(1) directly invokes the host state's law, and
empowers the tribunal to invoke rules of international
law. This arrangement raises three preemption
problems. First, to invoke a domestic law other
than that of the host state seems to be exclusively
within the discretion of the host state, acting
through its conflict rules, and not within the
tribunal's own competence. Secondly, the unqualified
language that "the Tribunal shall apply the law of the
Contracting State" makes it appear that the invocation
of the host state's law is mandatory. Combined with
the fact that the qualifying phrase "as may be appli-
cable" syntactically modifies only "international law"
but not "the law of the Contracting State," this
language seems to deny the tribunal the option of
applying host law selectively by disregarding particular
rules as not applicable. Finally, the same language
permits the inference that host state law shall pre-
empt the applicability of international law, so that
the tribunal may invoke international law only to the
extent that the particular point at issue is not
covered by the law of the host state.74 However, no
such preemption by the host state's law was in fact
recognized by the drafters, and a close analysis of
Art. 42(1) shows that the tribunal is competent to
determine which of the host state's rules are applicable
and which are not, and to invoke other national and
international rules.
74. See remarks by Lokur (India), Lara (Costa Rica),
and Florenzano (Ivory Coast) in the Legal Committee, id. at 802-3.
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In express terms, Art. 42(1) would seem to
allow the tribunal to apply prescriptions of a
national law other than that of the host state only
if it is called for by the latter's conflict rules.
However, such a reading has implications which
suggest that the tribunal's competence cannot have
been intended to be so limited. For example, the
host state's conflict rules would normally not
authorize the invocation of the regulatory or
administrative law of another state (such as that
of the investor), yet the other state may well have
a legitimate claim that such rules, addressed to
its nationals acting abroad, be respected by other
states. It would be inconsistent with the very
nature of an international tribunal to prohibit it
from according deference to such claims.
The draftsmen in fact recognized that under
certain circumstances, as in particular kinds of
transactions, states other than the host state
might have a paramount claim to have their own law
applied.75 They regarded the express invocation of
the host state's law merely as an acknowledgment of
the usual situation which would prevail in most
cases.7 6 Thus the question whether non-host state
law may be invoked independently of the host state's
conflict rules is a casus omissus and may not, by
reasoning that expressio unius est exciusio alterius,
be answered in the negative.
The drafting history of Art. 42(1) leaves
little doubt that the drafters intended to give to the
tribunal the competence to invoke non-host state law.
75. See remarks by Broches (Chairman) at Bangkok
Meeting, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 506 (host state law
inappropriate in certain types of agreements, such as know-how
agreements). See also Kahn & Fell, supra note 8, at 20 (host
state law inappropriate for loans).
76. See statement by Broches (Chairman) in the Legal
Committee, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 985 (suggesting that
demands for exclusive application of host state law were in-
tended merely to rebut the possibility of investor extra-
territoriality).
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The original language provided that:
In the absence of any agreement between the
parties concerning the law to be applied,
the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the
dispute submitted to it in accordance with
such rules of law, whether national or
international, as it shall determine to be
applicable.77
The section dealing with the law to be applied in
the absence of an agreement by the parties was later
extensively rewritten and amplified. "International
law" for purposes of Art. 42 was defin in accordance
with Art. 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.78 It was further clarified that
"national" and "international" law should not be
understood as mutually exclusive sets of rules.7 9
In an intermediate draft, the language "rules of
law, whether national or international," which might
have supported an inference of this kind, was there-
fore replaced by the unambiguous words "rules of
national and international law."'8 0 Subsequently,
77. Art. VI § 5(11, Working Paper, 2 HISTORY,
supra note 6, at 41. With only slight editorial changes this
text became the Preliminary Draft, Art. IV § 4(1), id.
at 214.
78. Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the I,C.J. provides:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted
to it, shall apply:
a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civ-
ilized nations;
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qual-
ified publicists of the various nations, as sub-
sidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
79. See proposal by Deguen (France), Geneva Meeting,
2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 421; statement by Broches (Chairman),
Legal Committee, id. at 800; Committee of the Whole, id. at 986.
80. First Draft, id. at 630.
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spokesmen for capital-importing states voiced con-
cern that the term "national law" might be used to
oust the applicability of the host state's law.8 1
In response to these concerns, and in partial
accommodation of farther-reaching demands that the
host state's law be given exclusive applicability,82
the present language expressly invoking the host
state's law was adopted.63 Thus, the more restrictive
language which was eventually adopted resulted from
the negotiating pressures under which the present
version was drafted in the midst of a contentious
debate, rather than from any substantive purpose.
The language of Art. 42(1) should therefore be
construed no more restrictively, as compared to the
earlier drafts, than is necessary in order to achieve
this limited purpose of the drafters.
The inference that the host state shall be
exclusively competent to invoke the law of other
states and that the tribunal is denied such competence
is also dispelled by the signatories' consent to
treat an arbitral award as equivalent to a domestic
court judgment. 8 4 The same considerations that
earlier led to the conclusion that this consent negated
an intent to make the parties exclusively competent
to invoke appl cable rules apply with equal persua-
siveness here.5 To the extent that enforcement of
an award might be sought in a state other than the
host state--most likely the investor's state--the
tribunal should apply the law of the latter if its
non-application might result in a violation of its
ordre pubZic as enforcement may not be denied on
such ground.06 Art. 42(1) should therefore be
81. See statements by Bilgen (Turkey), Geneva Meeting,
id. at 418, and by Melchor (Spain), id. at 419; proceedings
in the Legal Committee, id., at 804 (adopting present language).
82. See note 38 supra,
83. The Legal Committee approved the present presumption
in favor of the host state's law by a vote of 31 to 1. 2
HISTORY, supra note 6, at 804.
84. See note 62 supra.
85. See pp. 109-10 supra.
86. See note 63 supra.
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construed so as to permit the tribunal, concurrently
with the host state, to invoke applicable rules of
other states.
Two other possible preemptive implications
of Art. 42(l)--that the host state's law applies
in toto, and that international law applies only
interstitially--both rest upon the fact that invo-
cation of the host state's law does not contain the
disclaimer, "as may be applicable," which is attached
to the tribunal's authorization to invoke international
law. The drafting history, however, dispels both
of these inferences. The question was not expressly
raised whether the tribunal should be competent to
invoke host state law selectively to the extent that
the arbitrators found it applicable. In earlier drafts,
however, the problematical qualifying phrase clearly
referred to both sets of rules, national and inter-
national, that the tribunal was invited to invoke. 8 7
As was indicated previously, the circumstances lead-
ing to the adoption of the present language show
that the purpose of the redrafting was to clarify
that the claim of the host state to have its law
invoked could not be oustgd by reliance on the
language "national law. '' J Consequently, when read
in light of the earlier drafts, Art. 42(l) should
be understood to subject both host state law and
international law to the qualifying provision. This
reading makes the tribunal squarely competent to in-
voke the host state's law selectively--to invoke "such
rules ... as it shall determine to be applicable." o9
The interpretation of Art. 42(l) advanced here
places the host state's law and international law
on an equal footing, without any predeterminati 9 as
to which represents an a priori stronger claim.
87. Working Paper, 2 HISTORY, supra note 6, at 41,
and subsequent drafts, id. at 157, 214, 630.
88. See pp. 116-117 supra.
89. See note 63 and text accompanying note 77 supra.
90. See also Broches, supra note 2, at 390 (asserting
equal status of national and international law).
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This reading further suggests the proper arbitral
procedure to be followed in order to determine the
governing law in the absence of choice by the
parties. The tribunal would look first and fore-
most to the host state's law but would apply inter-
national law where it is called for by the host
state's law, or where it directly governs the point
at issue, as by virtue of a treaty. Where the host
state's law is inconsistent with international law,
the latter would displace the former.9 1
Of course this approach is adequate only
with respect to controversies arising out of
violations of the investment agreement itself. It
fails to address the problem of the proper law
applicable to injuries incurred in the course of
the investment relationship, but which do not violate
the investment agreement. In such circumstances the
controlling principle is that the investor was in-
tended to be placed, vis-a-vis his host state, in
as good a position as he would be in if he could call
on the diplomatic protection of his own state. 9 2
To the extent, therefore, that the investor suffers
a wrong which, absent the Convention, would be sub-
ject to redress from state to state, international
law would be applicable9 3 while the host state's
law would be entirely irrelevant.
As a result, in situations where the parties
have chosen domestic law as well as those in which no
choice was made, the circumstances to which interna-
tional law would nonetheless be exclusively applicable
91. Id. at 392-93; Broches, supra note 50, at 17.
92. See note 69- supra.
93. This conclusion finds further support in the fact
the international law is defined, for purposes of Art. 42, in
the broadest terms. See note 78 supra. The broad scope of the
definition is not mitigated by the fact that it includes the
cautionary notation that "allowance [should be] made for the
fact that Article 38 was designed to apply to inter-State dis-
putes." The qualifier merely states the obvious fact that
certain international law prescriptions, such as those of
diplomatic intercourse, by their nature have no bearing upon
private investments.
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must be determined by a close analysis of the scope
of the investment agreement. A likely instance
where the need for such determination would arise
would be a detrimental change in the host state's4
law subsequent to the placing of the investment.
The rights of the parties would generally be subject
to the host state's law as it may exist from time
to time. However, if the changes in the host state's
law were to amount to confiscation or another inter-
national tort--such as where their effect were
discriminatory--international law would apply to such
violation,95 even if the substance of the new host
state law did not otherwise conflict with inter-
national law.
The tribunal's broader authority in determining
the applicable law in disputes where the parties
have failed to designate the applicable law as
compared to those where they have done so creates
a correspondingly wider range of circumstances where
the substantive policy goals of the Convention should
enter into the tribunal's determination.90 As in
instances where there is a choice of law by the
parties, policy considerations would enter the deter-
mination of the parties's permissible scope of bar-
gaining, the substance of international rules, 97 and
94. Such was the case in the various cases brought under
the Convention against the Jamaican government. See Schmidt, supra note
21. However the issue of applicable law was never reached, as
the dispute was withdrawn from arbitration by the parties. See
note 4 supra.
95. See Goldman, supra note 61, at 153-54.
96. Among the major goals of the Convention is the
facilitation of private investment in developing countries to
the mutual advantage of both parties. See note 9 supra.
97. The drafters apparently expected that the substance
of the international rules which the tribunals might apply would
be variable and subject to the arbitrators' creativity. See
remarks by Broches in the Legal Committee, 2 HISTORY, supra
note 6, at 802 (proposed Art. 42 merely restates the practice
of arbitration tribunals in the past), replying to suggestion
by Wanasundera (Ceylon), id. at 801-2, that elaboration of
international law was needed, for otherwise the signatories would
be in the dark concerning the rules which might be invoked.
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the filling of obscurities or lacunae in the host
state's law in accordance with the non liquet
prohibition of Art, 42(2). In addition, the policy
goals espoused by the Convention would affect the
tribunal's determination whether any other domestic
law (or rules thereof) may be applicable as well as
which, if any, rules of the host state may be dis-
regarded as not applicable.
IV. Conclusion
Controversies over the proper law applicable
to a particular issue or dispute are most likely to
occur precisely in those areas where the substantive
determinations made by Art. 42 are indeterminate.
In such circumstances Art. 42 dictates no particular
result. Rather its contribution lies in the fact
that it provides a procedural mechanism whereby the
arbitral tribunal may in each case select the rules
of law appropriate to govern the controversy.
Under a proper interpretation of Art. 42, the
authority of the tribunal to make such determinations
is a broad one, which fact imposes a considerable
responsibility upon the tribunal. The result in each
case must be guided by a policy-oriented considera-
tion of each possible prescription, considering not
only whether it satisfies a reasonable demand of the
particular participants but more fundamentally whether
it contributes to the general goals of the Convention.
If the interpretation of Art. 42 advanced here
seems to destroy much of the certainty which the
provision appears to establish,9 8 it does enable
ICSID arbitrators to respond creatively to the
genuine needs and expectations of the parties and
thus to proceed in the tradition of international
arbitration at its best. 9 9 The rules to be applied
98. See Executive Directors' Report, 2 HISTORY, supra
note 6, at 1073 (stressing the importance of certainty of the
law which the tribunal will apply to investment disputes).
99. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 7, at 319 (stressing
creative role of arbitrators),
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in a specific case must be "proper" in the sense of
being acceptable to an audience of international
decision-makers which embraces many more participants
than the parties to the dispute at hand. Otherwise,
ICSID arbitration may fall into disuse, and its
potential as a counterforce to the fragmentation of
the world economic order will go unrealized.

